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ABSTRACT 
 
This study describes how firm level decisions and capabilities correspond to policy conditions in a 
host country where local market access is constrained and success is contingent on compliance 
with cultural hegemony.  Using data from surveys gathered from multinational enterprise (MNE) 
subsidiaries operating in China, we describe the mode of entry the firms have used to penetrate 
and exploit markets in light of the constrained strategic choices open to their subsidiaries.  We 
also expose the patterns of growth accomplished by the MNE and their underlying bases of 
competitive advantage.  Finally, we relate the degree of centralization we observe among the 
respondents’ strategies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
NE business executives experience challenges from more complex and competing forces when 
host country policy changes encourage the MNE to transfer more of its firm-specific core 
competences and the political environment encourages MNE subsidiaries to become innovation 
hubs for surrounding local or regional businesses.  Among the many causes of financial crises has been conflicting 
policy objectives imposed on managers (Laeven & Valencia, 2012).  Such consequences of cultural hegemony are 
the subject of critical cultural inquiry (Horkheimer, 1937; Castro-Gomez, 2001).  Using a critical inquiry lens, we 
suggest that a pre-dominating focus on the transfer of global technology and on its reengineering is likely to 
undermine the visibility and the prospects of original innovations rooted in the realities of the local culture and 
context. 
 
In 2006, Chinese government explicitly embraced indigenous innovation as the developmental pathway, 
focusing on creating an enabling environment for autonomous locally-embedded innovations (Atkinson, 2012).  To 
achieve the aim of uplifting indigenous innovation capacity, Chinese government put primary emphasis on ‘co-
innovation’ and ‘re-innovation’ through “assimilating and absorbing” advanced technologies transferred by the 
MNEs (McGregor, 2010).  Since local innovations are seen as contingent on the transfer of MNE’s firm-specific 
advantages, the subsidiaries are likely to find it difficult to fully leverage and link country-specific advantages with 
the complex firm-specific advantages, and therefore the innovations are likely to be oriented towards shallow 
adaptation of the foreign technology to the local situation.  By putting a primary emphasis on the transfer of foreign 
know-how, one unintended consequence will be that the local potential to develop innovative technological 
trajectories embedded in the country-specific advantages is discredited and subordinated. 
 
Based on the insights from the theory of organizational imprinting (Johnson, 2012), it is likely that in a 
policy context where local market access is constrained and the constraints are only gradually eased contingent on 
transferring upgraded technologies, the organizational culture and orientation of the MNE subsidiaries will be, in 
part, shaped by the initial strategy of giving primacy to the technological platforms and organizational approaches of 
M 
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the parent company.  When success in doing so opens access to the local market, the subsidiaries might continue to 
demonstrate a high level of path dependency.  Instead of pursuing innovations with an open mindset, they might 
continue to deploy hierarchical and application-oriented approaches rooted in the earlier organizational paradigm 
and only shallow adaptation to the local demand context.  Thus, their research and manufacturing might continue to 
be centralized and leadership in the human resource and the complex marketing roles continue to be centralized as 
well; only lower-level human resource and more tactical and generic marketing roles might be decentralized.  If this 
occurs, the subsidiaries will be vulnerable to deep weaknesses and overlooking deep opportunities because of a 
misalignment particularly of their human resource and marketing functions (where a high level of local 
responsiveness is expected) to their strategic realities.  Yet, they might hold socially constructed surface perceptions 
of strengths and opportunities – if the parental firm-specific advantages may allow them to contest market share 
from the local competitors with comparative ease.  The real potential for deeper capabilities and for deeper 
opportunities rooted in the popular grassroots culture may remain latent, hidden and invisible, and gradually be lost, 
assimilated, and subordinated to the institutionally legitimated and enforced alien foreign culture. 
 
In the existing literature, there is little discussion of the relationship between market access and strategic 
choice.  In our earlier paper (Salazar, et al, 2011), we laid the foundation for how policy would likely influence 
technology adoption.  Now we describe the strategic choices themselves.  Recently, Dongli (2013) studied the 
performance impacts of increased vertical integration, for example, but did so within a stable policy context.  The 
concept of `strategic choice' typically includes not only the establishment of structural forms but also the 
manipulation of environmental forces (Child, 1972).  This study examines a context wherein cultural hegemony 
enforces market constraints and influences choice.  Studies of increasing returns demonstrate that in a context of 
scale-intensive production, constrained market access will increase cost structure (Krugman, 1991).  The process of 
adapting to the high-cost situation under constrained market access will undermine the development less cost-
sensitive capabilities.  Similarly, the post-hoc and uncertain nature of the liberal market access will impede deep 
adaptation and inhibit the development of differentiation-sensitive capabilities.  Thus, we expect tensions between 
the export-oriented development and the deepening of Chinese capabilities for moving into a higher technology, 
higher skilled frontier.  The tensions between these two goals can produce instabilities as the government is forced to 
offer concessions in the form of access to local markets to achieve the second objective and as the policy of 
constraints and concessions create macroeconomic destabilization and contributes to inflationary pressures. 
 
Next, we discuss our sample and data on the MNE subsidiaries in China.  We then present our findings 
related to the mode and sequence of entry, growth and development patterns, bases of competitive advantage, degree 
of centralization, and research and development.  Finally, we discuss the major implications of our findings.  
Broadly, our study shows how micro-level decisions and capabilities respond to the macro policy where local 
market access is constrained and contingent on transferring upgraded technologies.  Based on our empirical data and 
discussion based on our findings, we show that the MNEs develop strategies that consider both export potential and 
local market potential, even if the local market potential may be initially constrained. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The review of global strategy literature for MNE generally presents a trade-off between an emphasis on the 
firm-specific advantages of the MNEs and their reliance on the local country-embedded innovations.  An interesting 
trend indicated that MNEs tend to focus either on global integration for exploiting firm-specific core competences or 
on local autonomy for tapping locally embedded benefits.  The degree of centralization by the parent MNEs varies 
upon the type of advantage exploited.  Mjoen & Tallman (1997) indicated that MNE centralization has generally 
produced no discernible negative impact on their foreign subsidiaries.  Studies of Chinese subsidiaries reported 
positive relationship between the two because of parents’ firm-specific advantages.  From a transaction cost 
perspective, higher firm specific advantage tends to prevent unintentionally technology spillage to a local partner 
(Williamson, 1985).  Other studies reported a negative relationship (Beamish, 1993) because of the need for the 
sampled subsidiaries to have greater local autonomy in achieving country-specific advantages in China. 
 
Some studies have shown that a global strategy might moderate the interaction between centralization and 
the subsidiary performance (Doz & Prahalad, 1994).  When MNEs pursue a globally integrated strategy, they tend to 
place more emphasis on MNE’s global network advantages so that the MNEs can obtain better control subsidiary 
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activities in developing and leveraging network competitive advantages.  On the other hand, when MNEs pursue a 
more locally responsive strategy, they are placing more on the subsidiary’s local competitive edge.  As a result, 
MNEs may offer higher degree of autonomy to the subsidiaries to achieve the local leverage and maintain better 
competitive positions over their rivals.  Bartlett (1986) used the two-dimension research framework (globalization 
pressure vs. local pressure) to advance three types of multinational corporations - global, multinational and 
transnational organizations.  In 1986, Bartlett and Ghoshal further developed the three-quadrant model by Stopford 
and Wells and replaced the original three-quadrant model by the four-quadrant model, using low reaction and low 
integration in the contingency presentation (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1:  Expansion Motivation 
 
When cultural distance (CD) between the parent MNE and the local country is high, it is more difficult to 
pursue global integration (Fan, Zhu & Nyland, 2012).  Multiple research results indicated that the higher the CD, the 
more control the MNE was likely to maintain over its foreign operations (Root, 1987; Davidson and McFeteridge, 
1985; Kim and Hwang, 1992).  Cultural distance has great impact on the ability of the MNEs in the process of 
global integration.  However, institutional constraints are likely to moderate this relationship.  The Chinese policy 
permits the entry of MNEs if they agree to transfer their technology, organizational and management know-how.  
Culture distance influences the mode of entry choices when the MNEs perceiver high cultural distance; they are 
more likely to rely on joint ventures (Kogut & Singh, 1988) because local partners can act as cultural informants for 
the MNEs (Fortier & El Hadrioui, 2012) and allow the MNEs to offer some autonomy to their subsidiaries to best 
exploit local resources and to best respond to the local contingencies. 
 
MNEs do not follow a strategy that is completely from centralization or completely from local autonomy 
because, in reality, certain functions are more centralized but others are more decentralized.  The Chinese 
government policy encourages MNEs to transfer their advanced firm-specific advantages.  For research and 
manufacturing, the MNE institutional adaptation reaction should embrace greater control of these functions because 
of the need to be consistent with the strategic demands to assure increasing returns.  The Chinese government policy 
also seeks a willingness to swap access to local Chinese market in exchange for the transfer of advanced technology 
(Deng, Falvey, & Blake, 2010), which would result in greater decentralization in exploiting the local access. 
 
Many scholars have tried to identify the roles of overseas subsidiaries using different perspectives (Bartlett 
and Ghoshal, 1986; Jarillo and Martinez, 1990; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Taggart, 1996).  As each of the 
subsidiaries is established by the MNEs in specific circumstances, each has a specific strategic task within in the 
MNE network. 
 
The role assigned to the subsidiary within the MNE’s global value chain is also likely to moderate the 
relationship between the degree of centralization and the subsidiary performance.  Generally speaking, all the 
following elements can cause the adjustment of initial role of the subsidiaries - the evolution of the global strategy of 
parent company, the environment of the host country, and the development target of overseas subsidiaries 
themselves.  The first two elements cause the passive adjustment of the role of subsidiaries, while the development 
target of overseas subsidiaries cause the active adjustment of the role of subsidiaries. 
Globalization 
Local Differences 
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Professor Mao Yunshi (1997) discovered that the first two investment motivations of foreign companies are 
"low labor cost" and "guarantee the quality of the product and the service".  The roles of the MNE subsidiaries in 
China are evolving from production-based to market-pioneer (Robinson, et al, 1992) based.  The main reason for 
this trend is the switch of the investment motivation of the MNES' subsidiaries in China. 
 
White and Poynter (1984) have identified two categories of subsidiary roles: one is a mixed copy of the 
parent MNE, where the subsidiaries are miniature replicas who replicate or adapt the MNE product and marketing 
plan in the local market, and the second is a rational manufacturer that produces parts or finished products for a 
multi-country market or functions as an off-shore center for downstream global value chain. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The sampled companies for this study were MNE subsidiaries in China (Table 1).  A total of 400 survey 
questionnaires were mailed to managers in more than thirty Chinese cities.  If the subsidiary was the result of a joint 
venture, we surveyed executives from the foreign holding firm, as well as the Chinese partner, to validate acquired 
information.  Follow up telephone calls and e-mails were employed to encourage participation. 
 
A total of 150 questionnaires were returned for a response rate of 38%.  Of those returned, 22 
questionnaires were incomplete and therefore unusable, resulting in a sample of 128 firms.  Of these MNE’s, 28 
(21.9%) were US subsidiaries, 22 (17.2%) were Japanese, 25 (19.5%) were from European Union countries, 43 
(33.6%) were South Korean, and the remaining 8 (7.8%) firms were from a variety of other countries. 
 
Table 1:  The Sample 
Firm Characteristics Firm Category N Percentage（%） 
Country Origin 
South Korea 
USA 
European Union 
Japan 
Others 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Australia 
Canada 
Malaysia 
Swiss 
43 
28 
25 
22 
10 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
33.6 
21.9 
19.5 
17.2 
7.8 
3.1 
1.6 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
Firm Nature 
Foreign Owned 
Foreign Holding 
Joint Venture 
91 
34 
3 
71.1 
26.6 
2.3 
Headquarters Location 
China Headquarters 
Global Headquarters 
Asia Pacific Headquarters 
Big China Headquarters 
Missing Data 
Others 
33 
31 
27 
7 
17 
13 
25.8 
24.2 
21.1 
5.5 
13.3 
10.2 
Industry 
Electronics 
Textile 
Chemistry and Pharmaceutical 
Iron, Steel, Mechanics and Engineering 
Auto Manufacturing 
Food and Beverages 
Commerce and Trade 
Transportation 
Tele-Communications 
Finance and Insurance 
Consulting 
Others 
Gasoline and Mining 
Real Estate 
Mass Communication 
35 
23 
15 
13 
9 
9 
7 
5 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
27.3 
18.0 
11.7 
10.2 
7.0 
7.0 
5.5 
3.9 
2.3 
1.6 
1.6 
1.6 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
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Table 1 cont. 
Respondent Categories 
Board Chairman 
Board Vice Chairman 
Board Members 
CEO 
Vice CEO 
Department Manager 
Others 
Missing Data 
3 
4 
6 
13 
16 
46 
31 
9 
2.3 
3.1 
4.7 
10.2 
12.5 
35.9 
24.2 
7.0 
Firm Age 
Less than 5 years 
5-9 years 
10-15 years 
More than 15years 
Missing data 
43 
49 
22 
10 
4 
33.6 
38.3 
17.2 
7.8 
3.1 
 
RESULTS 
 
Cheap natural resources and an available, low cost labor forces were the reason why 95% of respondents 
selected market exploration and production as the primary role of the subsidiary.  In fact, 97.8 % of all the 
production-based subsidiaries mentioned cheap labor as a motivating factor, suggesting that much of China’s 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) followed an external market/factor-seeking motivation.  Profit maximization was 
the primary reason for FDI and was the market motivator for MNEs but was not acknowledged as a reason for 
entrance into the Chinese marketplace even though the ability of an MNE to maximize profit has long been 
considered an important reason for international expansion (Cohen & Rugman, 1976). 
 
Mode of Entry 
 
Generally, Western MNEs perceive a high degree of cultural distance in China, which makes entry modes 
based on moderate commitment generally more appropriate, such as joint ventures.  Such entry modes rely more on 
the local participation as a way to benefit from the resources, networks, and knowledge of the local partners, and to 
adapt to the local cultural and institutional context.  In contrast, the East Asian MNEs perceive a lower degree of 
cultural distance in China, making entry modes based on high commitment, such as wholly owned subsidiaries, 
more appropriate.  Such entry modes allow the MNEs to better integrate local operations with their home and global 
operations because of a greater expectation of fit between their organizational structure, routines, and culture with 
the local context. 
 
In general, the MNEs surveyed do not favor acquisitions as their mode of entry into China.  In our sample, 
only 5.1% of the MNEs entered China through partial or full acquisition.  The Chinese government policy 
concerning foreign acquisition was vague and involved complicated procedures and documentation, along with 
restrictions within some industries and on the proportion of foreign equity holding.  Moreover, the overall initial 
quality and capabilities of domestic firms was relatively weak and were not perceived to complement the MNE 
growth strategy and add value to MNE core competences.  A few MNEs who pursued acquisitions were motivated 
primarily by rapid entry of Chinese markets and the shorter time required to reach acceptably efficient levels of local 
productivity.  Knowledge access, management personnel access, or funding access, were not shown to be significant 
by among respondents respondent. 
 
From Table 2, we can see that chi-square value is 10.594 with significance level of 0.05 and the probability 
P value of 0.014, which is less than α.  We can see from the Kruskal-Wallis Test that the ways of investing by the 
subsidiaries of multinational companies from different country origins were significantly different when they first 
entered the Chinese market. 
 
Table 2:  Sample Statistics 
 χ2 df P value 
Initial Entry of Investment 10.594 3 0.014 
Effective Sample 114   
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We tested the hypothesis that Western MNEs are more likely to use joint ventures as a mode of entry, while 
the East Asian MNEs are more likely to use wholly-owned subsidiaries as a mode of entry.  As shown in Table 3, our 
findings are consistent with this hypothesis.  The entry mode is correlated with the parental MNE national origin: χ2 
(3, N = 114) = 10.594, p < 0.05. 
 
Table 3:  Sample Entry Mode Type and Ownership 
Entry Mode US Japan EU Korea 
New wholly foreign owned firms 12 13 11 33 
New joint ventures 11 7 11 7 
Wholly foreign owned firms through acquisition 0 1 1 1 
Joint venture through acquisition or merger 2 0 1 0 
 
Our findings also show (Table 4) that multinational firms from the United States and the EU were similar in 
their initial investment modes and in entry forms of new wholly foreign owned firms and new joint adventures.  
However, the entry forms for firms from Japan and South Korea were significantly different than those for firms 
from the US and European Union.  When firms from South Korea and Japan first entered the Chinese market, they 
preferred wholly foreign-owned firms to new joint ventures.  The motives for additional direct investment reflected 
the MNE strategic intentions for MNE subsidiaries in China.  Therefore, study on investment motives is of particular 
importance in this research.  We verified our assumptions and inferences on the overriding motive for additional 
investment into MNE subsidiaries in China, which is to expand production base and realize the maximized profits 
from China growth potentials. 
 
Table 4:  Sample Investment Motivation 
Investment Motives Samples Mean Standard Deviation 
China’s economic growth optimistic expectations 104 4.08 1.040 
Seeking maximized profits 95 4.03 1.005 
Expanding production bases in China 94 3.87 1.008 
Expanding market share in China 91 3.87 .991 
Investment environment stability in China 104 3.84 1.006 
Sustaining low-cost advantages 89 3.78 1.085 
Competing global competitors 78 3.44 1.180 
Enhancing R&D capabilities in China  80 3.36 1.058 
Following existing clients 81 3.31 1.261 
 
Having analyzed the results of the frequency test on this topic from the data of our questionnaire, we 
ranked the MNE investment motives in China as shown in Table 5.  Our results suggest most respondents believed 
that China has great potential in its market growth and wanted to realize the greatest profits.  Economic optimism 
thus informed the strategic motives shown in the table. 
 
Table 5:  Ordered Investment Motivation 
Strategic Motive Samples Mean Standard Deviation 
Seeking maximized profits 95 4.03 1.005 
Expanding production bases in China 94 3.87 1.008 
Expanding market share in China 91 3.87 .991 
Sustaining low-cost advantages 89 3.78 1.085 
Competing global competitors 78 3.44 1.180 
Enhancing R&D capabilities in China 80 3.36 1.058 
Following existing clients 81 3.31 1.261 
 
Growth Patterns Observed 
 
We can further report that sales, investment scale, and market share have propelled the growth momentum 
for MNE subsidiaries in China.  We have identified three reasons for this strong momentum.  First, MNE 
subsidiaries in China are in the growth stage or just getting started in the Chinese market.  Establishing a corporate 
image, strengthen the branding effects and expand sales channels requires a great deal of local talent and requires a 
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large amount of capital investment.  Second, consider China’s huge market potential.  MNE subsidiaries in China 
are engaging in expanding production base and sales to gain market share.  Their strategic priority is not on the 
pursuit of profit or rate of return on investments at this time.  Third, the parent companies of multinational 
corporations assess the performance of subsidiaries using such indicators as sales volume, investment scale, and 
market share.  These appraisal indicators affect the management decision choices and operation activities of the 
subsidiaries in China.  We discovered two different behaviors of the subsidiaries. 
 
The results we observe in Table 6 indicate that the two most important growth indicators for MNE 
subsidiaries in China are sales volume, investment scale, and market share.  The mean scores were 3.77, 3.67, and 
3.61, respectively, which were much higher than those for other indicators.  Sample firm consensus rate on three 
important drivers reached 63.3%, 60.4% and 54.1%, respectively.  Most of the executives in this study agreed that 
sales volumes, investment scale, and market shares are three most important indicators for subsidiary growth. 
 
Table 6:  Drivers of Growth 
Growth Drivers Sample Size Mean Standard Deviation Sample Consensus % for Significance 
Sales volume 109 3.77 0.878 63.3 
Investment scale 96 3.67 0.842 60.4 
Market shares 96 3.61 0.875 54.1 
Profit 110 3.31 0.916 48.1 
Return on investment  92 3.24 0.839 43.5 
R&D investment 82 3.22 0.893 37.8 
 
Of course, sales volumes, investment scale, and market share are not only the concerns of the MNE parent 
companies, but they seem to serve as a necessary conditions for the survival of the MNE subsidiaries in their 
emerging phase or at the early stage of the growth phase.  We found that the parent companies show less concern for 
the research and development of their subsidiaries because of the relatively large funding without much promise of 
short term results.  We found two reasons for this phenomenon.  First, these performance indicators are easy to 
measure and recognize.  To survive, grow, and meet the parent company expectations, the subsidiaries have invested 
tremendously in these areas, both in money and human capital.  Subsidiaries exhibiting poor sales volume and 
market share results will often face serious consequences of getting less support from the parent company and have 
great risk of being merged or acquired, or even sold off.  The most typical case was Whirlpool, which acquired 
Snowflakes Appliances with an investment of $30 million.  Because the subsidiary did not meet Whirlpool’s 
expectations in sales and market performance, it was sold for only $2 million when withdrawing from the China 
market.  Dutch dairy giant Friesland Kraft Parmalat was another withdrawal case.  Before entering the Chinese 
market, these firms planned to make profit by the sixth year, but when their subsidiaries in China suffered losses for 
nine consecutive years with stagnating sales and unsatisfactory market share, they withdrew.  In the end, they 
decided to divest and withdraw from the Chinese market at a huge loss.  Later, they all regretted such a short-sighted 
choice when they saw their competitors got the market leadership positions and scanned the market with huge gains.  
Secondly, at the entry stage, multinational companies postponed research and development spending for their 
subsidiaries for two reasons: 1) Research and development indicators are not easily measured and evaluated and 2) 
China was relatively weak in scientific research at the time when most MNEs began to invest and they did not yet 
possess the necessary conditions to become regional research and development centers.  Thus, most of the 
multinational companies had housed their R&D centers outside China.  This greatly hindered the digestion of 
technological progress for local development and hurt the subsidiaries’ long-term growth.  Now, many multinational 
companies have increased research and development expenditures. 
 
Bases of Competitive Advantage 
 
Western MNE subsidiaries in the favorable strength-opportunity quadrant tended to have a broader base of 
sources of competitive advantage.  We found that the MNE subsidiaries, with a strong competitive position in terms 
of the relative market share in China – i.e., ratio of the firm’s market share and the market share of a dominant 
competitor - reported superior competitive advantages in product, service, customer relationship, quality, logistics, 
core technology, and R&D capability. 
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Because of their stronger connectivity with the advanced value chain in the parent home nation, Japanese 
MNE subsidiaries in the strength-threat quadrant tended to have a moderate, but somewhat lower base of 
competitive advantage sources.  Finally, because of their stronger exposure to the distributed global markets, Korean 
MNE subsidiaries in the weakness-opportunity quadrant had the weakest base of competitive advantage sources.  
Given the focus of the Chinese vendors and competitors on cost-oriented factors, perceptions of strength are likely 
to be correlated with a broad emphasis on differentiation, such as through diversified product portfolio and corporate 
image.  We found that MNE subsidiaries in China rely on local strategic alliances with procurement cost reduction 
as a primary motivation (more than 75% rated it significant).  Furthermore, MNE subsidiaries in China had high 
awareness of the need and procedures to enhance customer satisfaction, improve corporate image, implement 
customer relationship management and service assurance so that firms could get closer to their customer and 
improve the company's image in the marketing strategy.  This customer service orientation of MNE subsidiaries in 
China gave them competitive advantage over the product-centric manufacturing and sales push orientation common 
among Chinese state-owned enterprises – primary competitors in many sectors of the economy.  Customer service-
orientation helped MNE subsidiaries in China re-design their marketing strategy to reduce costs while improving the 
service quality by focusing on enhancing the overall firm image rather than on advertising or branding image of 
individual product.  We tested the hypothesis that the MNE subsidiaries in the strength-opportunity quadrant are 
likely to demonstrate stronger emphasis on broad differentiation (product portfolio, corporate image), followed by 
those in the strength-threat quadrant.  Those in the weakness-opportunity quadrant are likely to demonstrate weakest 
emphasis on broad differentiation.  As shown in Table 7, the data are consistent with this hypothesis. 
 
Table 7:  Perceived SWOT Posture 
Variable Comparing Groups Difference 
Corporate image 
SO-ST 0.14 
ST-WO -0.36* 
SO-WO 0.50** 
Product portfolio 
SO-ST 0.09 
ST-WO 1.00** 
SO-WO 1.09** 
Note:  **p<0.05; * p<0.01 
 
Degree of Functional Centralization 
 
The MNEs often pursue localization strategy through decentralization of selected functions.  When the 
activities of relevant functions are not appropriately adapted to the local context, the likelihood of committing costly 
errors tends to be high.  In our research, marketing and human resource functions were most frequently cited areas 
of strategic blunders by the MNE subsidiaries in China.  These were also the functions where the MNEs tended to 
pursue a higher degree of localization and granted more autonomy to their local Chinese subsidiaries. 
 
In the marketing function, greater emphasis on local markets was correlated with greater autonomy in 
marketing research and forecasting, choice of target markets, and product-focused advertising, while greater export 
orientation was correlated with a centralized role by the parent MNE in these areas.  These differences were related 
with the overall strategic emphases by the subsidiaries of different nations on various marketing elements. 
 
In general, the US MNE subsidiaries put a greater priority on market research and forecasting, while the 
European subsidiaries emphasized product-focused branding.  The more export-focused and globally integrated 
Japanese and South Korean subsidiaries were more concerned about their corporate image for long-term 
development.  Maintaining a robust product portfolio was an important element for all these subsidiaries. 
 
Errors were attributed by the MNE subsidiary executives to the differences in the Chinese culture, lack of 
resources and support for adequate local adaptation from the parent MNE, and adjustments in corporate strategy, 
such as increased focus on the local market.  More broadly, MNEs were motivated by scale-oriented investment 
factors – specifically, expanding the Chinese production base, capture market share, and gain or maintain an 
advantageous cost position. 
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China was seen as a global manufacturing hub and the low-cost as an advantage for rapid expansion and to 
reduce global production costs.  MNEs emphasized product quality and brand image in order to differentiate 
themselves against the local Chinese players who also enjoyed the same low-cost Chinese platform in order to 
successfully penetrate and satisfy the emerging Chinese market demand.  They perceived other MNE subsidiaries in 
China, who were capable of similar differentiation and who also enjoyed similar cost advantage, to be their closest 
competitors – not the local Chinese players.  In this context, the most important performance measures from the 
perspective of the MNE parents were revenues and profits, followed by market share, product quality, return on 
investment, and customer satisfaction. 
 
Human resources, R&D, and social responsibility were of limited importance.  With expansion of Chinese 
market and intensification of scale-based competition, the existing resources and inputs became increasingly 
insufficient for additional growth to satisfy the global strategy adjustment need of the parent company. 
 
The emphasis on the scale-oriented measures by the Chinese subsidiaries was attributed partly to their ease 
of measuring, quantifying, and implementation.  Therefore, the subsidiaries in China used these appraisal indicators 
for management decision choices and operation activities.  While the parent MNEs were often willing to assume low 
profitability, low rate of return, and low cost reductions for fairly long periods on the assumption of a long-term 
commitment to China, they were less benevolent with subsidiaries who demonstrate poor sales volume and market 
shares. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
MNEs establish overseas subsidiaries to optimize resource allocation and to maximize profits.  The 
strategic choices the parent makes for its overseas subsidiaries are influenced by public policy goals in host 
countries.  Among MNEs' subsidiaries in China, the choices must satisfy, on one hand, parent performance 
requirements, and, on the other, must conform to the constrained resources that China provides.  According to our 
survey, the major investment motives of the MNEs' subsidiaries in China include exploring China's market 
(66.07%), establishing production bases (55.36%), seeking profits (49.11%), and making use of the cheaper labor 
force (43.75%). 
 
The primary roles assigned to subsidiaries in China are to be low cost production centers for their global 
value chains and to penetrate the national market.  These role mandates vary by the parental MNE origin.  Japanese 
MNEs have assigned their subsidiaries a primary role of exporting the production from China back to the home 
nation for advanced value addition and then re-export to the global market.  Korean MNEs have assigned a primary 
role of exporting the production to multi-country markets worldwide.  The US and European MNEs have assigned a 
primary role of using the production from China to develop and penetrate Chinese domestic market and a secondary 
role of supporting value-added production and direct needs of the home base and other global markets. 
 
The policy of the Chinese government has been to offer access to Chinese market as a carrot in order to 
induce MNEs to share more sophisticated know-how with their Chinese subsidiaries.  The general policy perception 
seems to be that if the MNEs are offered greater access to the Chinese market and are permitted to decimate or 
acquire the local enterprises, they often function without supporting technological growth of China.  The findings of 
the present research suggest that at least some degree of increased access to Chinese market might actually enable 
the Chinese subsidiaries to develop new knowledge bases, based on the unique cultural and historical endowments 
of China, in order for them to compete effectively in the local market.  To benefit from these new local knowledge 
bases, the MNEs are likely to provide greater strategic autonomy to Chinese subsidiaries and, over time, also be 
willing to more openly share know-how with them as part of a bilateral, or even multilateral, system of knowledge 
exchange throughout the MNE network.  All this might accelerate knowledge transfers into China.  In addition, 
greater participation in the local market is associated with greater participation by the subsidiary in the inter-
subsidiary knowledge system, which in turn opens a world of new opportunities for the subsidiary.  Conversely, 
when the factories have to serve the fragmented needs of the different, dispersed markets around the world, their 
weaknesses may be exposed and the opportunity may appear to be overwhelming, leading to labor confrontation, as 
evidenced by the experiences of the Korean MNEs. 
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Multinational corporations attempting to establish powerful, local control face intense competition in the 
host environment and find it both time and cost consuming.  Multinational corporations must be well aware of this 
challenge when they make their choices on entry model, strategic objectives, and business evaluations for their 
subsidiaries. 
 
Without access to the local market, some global factories may be optimized to a sub-optimal scale and not 
benefit from sufficient deepening of the cost sensitive capabilities.  The results may be cost-push, as well as unfilled 
demand inflation, which may further weaken the cost effectiveness of those operations and result in losses and 
revenue stagnation and forced withdrawal.  When an export-oriented factory is financially troubled, the government 
is forced to lure the foreign MNEs through a variety of tax concessions.  When these tax concessions also do not 
work, then the government is forced to react by offering concessional local loans and also offer access to the local 
market. 
 
Many Western MNEs, who entered China with a view of China as the world factory, have found it 
necessary to adjust their global strategy and focus more on the Chinese domestic market.  The exception may be 
when the Chinese factories are intended to serve highly specialized needs that are in low demand within China.  This 
is akin to the Japanese case where the MNEs use Chinese base as off-shore linkage into their more complex value-
adding home operations and therefore connect it to the local operations in the home innovation network to give 
greater emphasis to innovations by their Chinese subsidiaries.  However, in this case, the environment appears more 
threatening because of the accentuated dependencies on the parent MNE, idiosyncrasies of innovations, and limited 
flexibility. 
 
Our findings suggest that Chinese subsidiaries have not yet built deep levels of marketing capabilities.  
Constrained openness of the Chinese markets has resulted in lower attention paid to the development of deeper 
marketing capabilities that are associated with adapting to the local market conditions.  Without deeper marketing 
capability, the nature of local marketing decisions tends to focus on identifying target markets, forecasting demand, 
and pushing products through advertising, rather than on brand management and product development.  Similarly, in 
HRM, more freedom is given to local decision-making; however, expatriates dominate the senior positions and 
without local role models in the senior positions, the motivation and the opportunities for skill development and for 
authentic local approaches are likely to be constrained.  The Western MNEs who have achieved high levels of 
penetration into the Chinese market tend to demonstrate a broader base of subsidiary competitive advantages, 
followed by the Japanese MNEs who have integrated Chinese low-cost production base with their additional value 
adding high-end production base in Japan.  The Korean MNEs who use the Chinese low-cost production base for 
serving different markets globally actually demonstrate very narrow level of subsidiary competitive advantage.  In 
order to compete effectively in the Chinese market, the local subsidiaries need to have stronger and broader 
competitive advantage over their competitors.  The intended locus of this competitive advantage is primarily broad 
level of differentiation – corporate image and product portfolio - but it has also produced an advantage in other 
functions that help to compete on the basis of service orientation.  Finally, it is notable that for the MNEs seeking to 
participate in the local market, joint ventures act as an important mechanism for learning and relation building; 
however, most joint venture partners in China have global ambitions and appear to prefer the MNEs globally 
integrated strategy that gives them access to the global best practices and that leaves the local market for them.  In 
order to serve the interests of both the MNE and the local partner, these joint ventures might be considered a lab for 
synergistic learning and innovation.  They may be complemented with separate and autonomous operations of both 
parties for serving their respective global ambitions. 
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